by Jims | March 19th, 2011
The Next Reformation, by Carl Raschke. Michigan: Baker, 2004. Pp. 235. Reviewed by James L. Smyrl, Ph.D.
Carl Raschke seeks to establish a polemic in favor of a postmodern reformation. It is not that he is asking for churches to go outside the bounds of the first reformation, but rather to embrace, what he perceives as the true principles and foundations of the first reformation. He develops his argument for today’s church to embrace the first reformation, but contends that true reformation principles are indeed postmodern in nature. Raschke proposes a threefold purpose for this book; namely, correct false analogies of postmodernism by proposing that it is essentially tied to the reformation; note how Christianity connected itself, with detrimental results, with Cartesian rationalism and British evidentialism, thus compromising the intent of the first reformation; and fundamentally to pursue the goal of convincing those who have looked disjunctively at postmodernism to view it as an opportunity to perpetuate evangelical Christianity.
Raschke believes that the battle cry of the next reformation will be “by faith alone” and “by Scripture alone.” However, his understanding of the role of Scripture in reformation from history and for the next reformation, is not consistent with historical evangelical Christianity. Raschke vies for a more experiential approach to “Scripture alone” than most who hold to an evangelical view of Scripture.
Noting the current view of postmodernism, Raschke, correctly asserts, that the evangelical community believes postmodernism encourages nihilism, relativism, emotionalism, and irrationalism. He offers a condescending attack against Doug Groothuis for erroneously leading evangelicals to attack postmodern Christianity. Raschke disavows Groothius’ assertion that postmodern Christianity is a complete rejection of objective truth. Raschke uses a rhetoric of discrediting Groothius by stating that he made, “many of the same arguments against postmodernist that American and British philosophers had been making against the claims of Christianity for generations.” This pattern of diversion to other similar erroneous arguments is used throughout the book.
Raschke cites Graeme Codrington as a powerful defender of postmodern Christianity. He notes that Groothius’ model of rationalists acquirement of knowledge has failed and that postmodernists believe objective truth is attainable; they only question the ability to distinguish truth from non–truth. It is this indistinguishable truth that Raschke affirms as the motivation for believers to embrace postmodernism. Postmodernism’s basic premise is the attainment of truth by an encounter or experience with Christ, rather than by rationalistic means. He does however concede that subjective truth has propagated the gospel much more effectively than objective truth. He cites cases where many believers come to Christ, not by a reasonable argument in favor of objective, rational truth, but rather by the inner experience of wrestling with their sin and God’s offer of redemption.
His pattern of diversion continues as he notes the pharisaical manner of rationalizing God’s message, but it was Jesus pattern to speak in experiential parables. Raschke builds an argument for the form of ministry in Scripture to match the form of ministry today, but does not demonstrate a link between the different contexts of the here and now and Scripture. He argues that postmodernism is a term that simply defines the spirit of the times.
An attack is launched against foundationalism by tying it to empiricism and logical positivism. He defines foundationalism only from the perspective of its use of propositional statements and rational truth claims. The narrow definition leans on his premise that reformation truth is not asserted propositions, but rather gained through experience. He goes so far as describing this process of truth acquirement as synonymous with the reason for communism’s demise. He notes that the modernist approach failed in conjunction with foundationalism, because of its use of objective propositional truth.
Raschke describes what “really” happened during the reformation and notes that its current understanding among evangelicals is skewed, due to a belief that since postmodernism is inherently bad, the original reformation could not embrace any tenants thereof. He notes that Luther’s fundamental attack against the church was its claim that priestly mediators and learned theologians were necessary to understand God’s will and word. From this “protestant principle,” Raschke notes three tenets of the reformation: Included are the notion that one cannot attain heaven without a personal belief in God; Scripture alone; priesthood of all believers. Raschke concludes from these tenents, “the singularity of personal belief and the sovereignty of individual conscience were construed almost exclusively as religious considerations during the sixteenth century” (26). Raschke argues that the issue of the priesthood of all believers is essentially a postmodern concept that was skewed by rationalism in the early seventeenth century. It is his perceived intention of the original reformation’s view of “the sovereignty of individual consciousness” that it is postmodern in nature and must be embraced by the church today in order to usher in the next reformation.
John Locke is presented as the one who led in the effort to elevate the original intention of the reformation by elevating the experiential nature of the intellect. Raschke states that Locke believed all human knowledge is founded in experience. It was not God’s account of miracles or the supernatural that allowed man to know Him, but rather the effect of such accounts on man. He notes that postmodernism contribution to this point in history was a demonstration of the detrimental direction that modernism was leading man. He, again, produces a distraction from the point by noting the manner in which the destruction of the Jerusalem temple served as a catalyst for Christianity. In like fashion, the postmodern destruction of reason and propositional truth acquirement serves as a catalyst for evangelicalism. It is in this challenge to seek such a catalyst, that Raschke spends the remainder of the book detailing the manner in which the next reformation will emerge from a return to the true principles of the first reformation.
The early chapters of this work outline the major philosophical influences of two hundred years. Raschke reinterprets much of the contemporary understanding of philosophers, by indicating postmodernism is not a relatively recent concept, but is anchored in philosophical advancement from the past two centuries. He details the rise of many philosophical models that served as a means by which postmodernism could launch a staunch rejection.
Beginning with Kant’s sketch of the manner in which understanding is derived from prior subjective understanding; Raschke unfolds multiple philosophical advances that, once rejected after failure, catapulted a desire for postmodernism. He notes that Kant was not purporting relativism or placing truth in the hands of each individual, but affirmed the use of reason to make valid judgments and this ability is not from encounters with the universe, but rather are inherent in the human mind. Noting Kant’s use of “structure” and “foundation” as synonyms, Raschke highlights the postmodernist rejection of all forms of foundationalism. He notes, “The grounding of faith in reason, however, empties faith of its content” (44).
Continuing his trace of historical imperatives that serve as a backdrop to postmodernism, Raschke provides a brief overview of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Derrida. In relation to Jacques Derrida’s contribution to postmodernism, he notes, “The philosophical trends now decipherable as postmodernism have rested on the premise that metaphysics must not be condoned, but must be “overcome” in order to contend with the inherent nihilism of the metaphysical enterprise itself” (48). Raschke believes that Luther’s call to “let God be God” is a postmodern summons to release the concept of God from reason.
He summarizes Nihilism and Deconstruction in an attempt to show their influences on postmodernism. Responding to Derrida’s statement that writing eliminates the meaning of what is written, Raschke emphasizes that deconstructionist shows the lack of a valid understanding of anything upon first impression. This understanding, according to Derrida, does not come from the words of the text, but rather from the individual’s encounter with the text. Up to this point, the reader seems to plow through a loosely organized series of class notes that are attempting to aim at a historical link to postmodernism, but find difficulty reaching their target.
Chapter three begins to unravel the confusion of the first two chapters and fulfill the promises contained in the thesis. Raschke moves to the anti-rationalism of the current culture in America, indicating that this revolt is a major force behind resurgence in postmodern ideals. He notes that the resurgence within theological postmodernism had little to do with a resurgent evangelicalism, but rather was a reaction within liberalism against liberalism. He notes that Kant established the prelude to the next reformation as an effort “to remove knowledge in order to make room for belief” (75). The acquirement of knowledge at the dawn of postmodernism emphasized a rational, propositional approach to knowledge. Postmodernism sought to break away from such an approach thus making room for belief. According to Raschke, Kant believed that faith could be rational, but reason could not take the place of faith. So the goal began to emerge for the deliverance from propositional truth to truth that is communicated in by other means. Heidegger is noted as purporting that, “the syntax of language does not duplicate the structure of reality any more than a map reflects the territory” (80). Raschke assumes all this leads to a “snapshot approach to ultimate reality” through propositional logic that leaves one without substantive knowledge.
Noting the help of deconstructionists towards postmodernism, Raschke states, “Deconstruction was designed to eliminate the prepositional pipe fitting that, according to standard philosophy, links tow planes of reality, the verbal and the essential” (83). He believes that deconstruction eliminated the idea that language can produce the same effect on an individual as the experience. He indicates that in Paul’s letters, in which the value contained was not that of a treaty, but the value was in the inherent relational nature of the letters. According to Raschke, the value of the gospels is not in the words, but what one might say about the words and how they are applied in life.
Raschke proclaims the demise of modernism and all its tenets based in reason and objective rationality. He notes that we live in a “sensate culture” that will not be reformed by modernist attempts to communicate truth. Raschke perceives the failure of Protestantism is that it “only exchanged the Bible for the church as the source of authority. It did not alter the method of drawing implications from that authority” (93). He notes that Luther, Wesley, Jonathan Edwards, and others added experience as the primary means by which they communicated truth. Raschke believes their actions to eliminate Aristotelian rhetorical components from preaching were purely of a reformation nature. From these premises, Raschke notes that the next reformation will be about faith alone.
The subject matter returns to deconstructions influence on postmodernism. John Caputo believes that the true nature of the reformation is the essence of deconstructionism. He notes that deconstructionism is essentially “dehellenizing Christianity.” This act is grounded in the belief that God can not be known through rhetorical, propositional statements, but only through experiential faith. The reader does not have to wait for an answer to the question, “What about the emphasis on Scripture in the first reformation?” This is where his polemic in favor of his view of the first reformation comes to the surface. He notes that the reformation “adhered to the conviction that the Holy Spirit could guide each believer to a patent understanding of the meaning of Scripture” (117). So from the foundation of faith, the believer is afforded the opportunity to allow the word to speak to his heart. It is this encounter that Raschke contends was the heart of Luther’s reformation principles. He states, “They insisted that individual experience, as well as private interpretation of that experience, could be taken as authoritative, even at the expense of Scripture” (117). Raschke asserts that the reformation planted the seed for the postmodern hermeneutic that mediates the reality of God’s Word on an individual basis. He notes that God’s Word is true because it has been spoken to the individual.
He further notes the emphasis in the reformation and the postmodern movements is on faith alone rather than scripture alone. Raschke states, “Sola scriptura, therefore, emanates from the imperative of sola fide, not the other way around. Luther affirmed the ultimacy [sic] of scriptural authority because the Bible is the ‘literacy’ of the text that captures our understanding and lead us to the ‘truth’ of salvation, which is no proposition at all” (133). His assumption is that truth is founded in the essence of a relationship, and not in facts because facts are impersonal and have no real communicative value. He, weakly, concludes that if this assertion were not true then Jesus would have written a book instead of going to the cross. Raschke further states that Luther did not believe the truth of Scripture was propositional, but that the Scripture is true because of its relational nature. A relationship is established between this relational understanding of truth and Jesus’ call for His disciples to know Him in a personal manner. Raschke does not indicate why Jesus presented this truth in propositional statements, nor how the disciples grasped the propositional invitation in a manner that they could act upon.
Turning the focus to the priesthood of all believers, the content of the book begins to assimilate a model of postmodernism within Christianity. He notes that postmodernism can be narrowed to the following traits: the flattening of hierarchies at all levels; the development of webs of interconnectedness that do not have any hierarchies or chain of command; constant change with superficial phenomena taking precedence over deep structures (146.) Raschke states that postmodernism dissolves the state form of social structure and replaces it with a “heterogeneity of relationships in and through society as the immanence of culture” (151). This philosophy results in cell groups where there is no hierarchy or denominational structures. He traces this postmodern practice to the reformation principle of decentralizing clerical authority. It is the emphasis on sola fide that allows for a connection between Christians and God, and between believers in a community relationship. He sums up this relational concept by stating, “the real is relational and the relational is real” (158).
Chapters seven and eight offer little for the argument of the author or the understanding of the reader. Like the first two chapters, these appear to be space fillers rather than substantive content supporting his thesis. Each seems to be without cause, in the context of the rest of the book. He does attempt to connect the Mars Hill strategy of evangelism with a purely postmodern theory of church, but actually spends much time proving little. He notes that the model of the postmodern church must follow Luther’s goal of recovering the mood of the primitive church. He briefly overviews the postmodern principles of the emerging church and Pentecostal movement, but this example does little to help his argument.
His concluding chapter launches one final assault on propositional truth and one final apologetic for a Luther who was postmodern. He notes, “Luther would have been regarded as a postmodernist by the standards of his day” (208). He indicates that Luther was not concerned about the content of Scripture in his reformation principles, but rather with the manner in which Scripture spoke to him. Raschke attempted to prove this theory in his chapter on the priesthood of the believer, but offered no substantive data from Luther to demonstrate his claim. He offers none in the conclusion either. He notes that the reason propositional truth cannot be Christian in nature is that it is not unconditional. Neither can it be personal or relational. He concludes that it is impossible to develop a systematic theology from the Bible, for it is not a system of debatable propositions. One final distraction is raised in his conclusion. He notes, “After all, many of the pagans’ accusations at the time against Christians, which prompted the rise of apologetics, are eerily similar to what many evangelicals say about postmodern Christianity” (210).
Raschke sets out to establish a historical, reformation foundation for postmodernism. His ultimate goal is to persuade the church to return to a postmodern practice, thus returning to a reformation principle. His premise is masterful in its approach to attract sometimes hostile evangelicals to a postmodern philosophy, but his approach is lacking in integrity and scholarship. His work is replete with quotes taken out of context, assertions made without any historical link, and a presupposition that since propositional truth is too rigid, the only other alternative is postmodernism. His argument that postmodernism is actually a reformation principle is regularly and diversely asserted, but in no way demonstrated as accurate. He provides no conclusion to his discourse, no plan to move the adherent to his side, and no recourse for one to demonstrate the accuracy of his claim.
